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Abstract
There are doubts about the competitiveness of real-world
commodity trade and storage. Thus, we present a model of
oligopolistic commodity speculation, in which a limited number of
speculators practice non-cooperative storage in an infinite horizon
game. A significant technical difficulty due to the non-negative
stock constraint is overcome, and a tractable sub-game perfect
equilibrium is presented, in which it is shown that less is stored
and prices are more volatile than under perfect competition. It
turns out that a tax on consumption of the good would increase
storage, stabilize prices, increase welfare and raise speculative
profits; the oligopolists would thus lobby for a tariff raised against
their own shipments.
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1. Introduction.
This paper offers a contribution to the theory of speculative equilibrium in markets for
storable commodities.
Great strides have been made over the past decade in the theory of stochastic and dynamic
equilibrium in primary commodity markets. One large impetus in this direction was the work
of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981); developments have been made by, for example, Scheinkman and
Schechtman (1983), Newbery (1984), Deaton and Laroque (1991) and in various work by
Williams and Wright, largely surveyed in Williams and Wright (1991). However, the relationship
between storage and market structure has not been much explored. The overwhelming majority
of existing studies assume perfect competition. Two exceptions are Newbery (1984) and
Williams and Wright 1991, ch.ll). Newbery explores dominant producer equilibria, in which
one large producer/speculator exploits its market power while a submissive competitive fringe
accepts zero storage profits and takes price as given. Williams and Wright survey the theory of
monopoly in storage. There appears to be little work examining the consequences of restricted
entry into the business of commodity trade or storage or of strategic competition among primary
commodity speculators. The nearest approximations are in the theory of oligopolistic extraction
of a natural resource (e.g., Reinganum and Stokey (1985), Sundaram (1989) and especially Loury
(1990) which can be read as a model of strategic storage). However, this literature does not have
to cope with the issues of random harvests and stockouts which are central to many agricultural
commodities.
2This paper represents a step into that field, with a stochastic model of an n-member
speculation oligopoly. It is a quite simplified model. There are no futures. Storage and
speculation are treated as the same thing, and the speculators are the only middlemen between
producers and consumers. Nonetheless, the model is not easy to solve, and since in real markets
it is difficult to separate storers, speculators and traders, it is hoped that it may shed some useful
insight on some actual markets.
The idea of storage or speculation as being carried out by an oligopoly has a quite plausible
ring in some primary commodity markets. Trade in some of these markets is highly
concentrated, and there can be important fixed costs to entry. Some accounts of the world grain
trade, for example, stress the importance of large fixed costs in storage and transport facilities
which must be incurred in order to compete and which contribute to the dominance of that trade
by five very large firms. For example, Morgan (1979, p.97) describes the massive elevator at
Baie-Comeau, Quebec and ancillary transport infrastructure which Cargill had to construct in
1959 before it was able to compete in the European market. The same author argues that Cargill
and a competitor, Continental, controlling one half of the grain storage space in U.S. ports
between them, have genuine market power in grain storage (p. 235). Similar observations have
been made about a variety of tropical commodities in which trade has long been highly
concentrated (for example, Bauer (1953) and Maizels (1984, pp. 28-9)).
Further, evidence on the returns to speculation in primary goods seem to show that the large
players have tremendous informational advantages over small ones. This was shown with futures
data by Houthakker (1957), who concluded that only large traders could forecast commodity
prices at all. Hartzmark (1987), with daily data on the individual positions of more than 5,000
3traders on a variety of commodities, found that only the large ones even broke even and only
those who dealt in the good commercially as well as trading it in futures made any systematic
positive returns. In addition, 58% of the profits were made by only Jive of the traders. Thus,
it seems that only a handful of traders have the information network to speculate successfully.
The creation of this network entails a second kind of fixed cost of entry1.
As a theoretical matter, if oligopoly is ruled out erroneously, the nature of the equilibrium
predicted may be qualitatively as well as quantitatively wrong. Both monopoly and perfect
competition (see Scheinkman and Schechtman (1983) and Deaton and Laroque (1991)) typically
yield unique equilibria through contraction mapping arguments, but one of the great themes of
recent oligopoly research is the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria they generally offer including
collusion and its collapse, price wars and so forth (see Shapiro, 1988, for a survey). Thus, there
could be patterns in time series for commodity prices that simply do not make sense without
imperfect competition. However, this is merely a conjecture and is beyond the scope of this
paper.
A serendipitous benefit of this research is a method of solving linear-quadratic games with
a constraint which might prove useful in the theory of production oligopoly with storable output.
Here, the constraint is the non-negativity of stocks. Usually, infinite horizon oligopoly models
'The need to build an information network to compete effectively fits into the "endogenous
sunk cost" paradigm of Sutton (1991), contrasted with exogenous sunk costs such as fixed costs
incurred in building an elevator. Sutton (Ch. 3) shows that if the important sunk costs are
endogenous, a market can remain highly concentrated even as demand grows arbitrarily large and
technology is held fixed, because a rise in demand, rather than encouraging entry, raises
equilibrium investments by the incumbents, thus also raising the cost of entry for a potential
entrant. This may be the most plausible explanation for the high levels of concentration in trade
in certain commodities, where investments in network building probably greatly exceed fixed
costs in storage.
4need to allow for negative inventories to get any results to mention (e.g., Judd (1990), Kirman
and Sobel (1971)) because with a constraint that sometimes binds, even a linear-quadratic model
becomes unmanageable by analytic methods. Here we apply a trick from competitive commodity
theory that makes things work out neatly. Whether or not it has other uses remains to be seen.
Section 2 reviews perfectly competitive storage equilibria with linear demand; Section 3
takes the same setting with a fixed set of speculators and studies a game theoretic equilibrium;
Section 4 studies some special properties of the equilibrium, including the striking
"independence" property whereby rational speculators "ignore" each other. Section 5 discusses
the assumption of fixed storage capacities, and the difficulties in relaxing it. Section 6 derives
some implications of the model for the time path of prices, and gives numerical examples.
Section 7 concludes.
2. A Review of Perfect Competition.
We use essentially the same setting as Newbery (1984), and for ease of comparison will use
much of the same notation. We assume a market with n speculators, who face a constant linear
demand schedule so that the price of the good in period t is pt = a - bCt, where a,b>0 and Ct
is the amount sold to consumers in period t. The crop is harvested once a year and follows a
simple i.i.d. process: a "normal" crop h+ is reaped with probability p and a "drought", with crop
h" < h,+occurs with probability 1-p. We will denote the average crop as h. The producers are
perfectly competitive and separate from the speculators; it is best to think of a large number of
small farmers and consumers who together with the n speculators buy and sell the good on an
anonymous auction market.
The speculators have a storage technology as follows: speculator j can store a quantity of
inventories no less than zero and no greater than her capacity constraint KJ. There is a financial
cost of k per unit held from one period to the next, and in the interval a fraction 8 will spoil.
Speculators do not have the option of burning or discarding stocks (perhaps 8 includes the cost
of disposing of goods that have "turned", but other stocks may not be discarded). Finally, all
speculators are risk neutral, and have a discount rate equal to p.
The first question of interest is: what would happen if, instead of having the number of
speculators fixed at n, there was free entry into the sector and all speculators took price as given?
Clearly profits from speculation would be driven to zero, and hence the definition of equilibrium:
DEFINITION: A function (p:Dx{h\h+}->M+, with D c [0,K] and IeD implying (l-S)<p(I,h) e D,
is an equilibrium iff:
0for all Ie[0,K] and for h = h+ or h", where E^  stands for expectations with respect to the harvest,
K is the aggregate capacity constraint, and whenever one of these inequalities holds strictly, the
other must hold with equality.
The function (j> gives the equilibrium level of storage. Inequalities (2.1) guarantee that the
cost of investing in another unit of stocks, pt + k, is always at least as great as the expected
revenue it would bring, |3(l-5)pt+1, so that profits can never be positive in expectation. Further,
if speculators strictly prefer to dump stocks (i.e., the first inequality holds strictly), they will not
carry any out; and if they carry stocks out (i.e., the second inequality holds strictly), then they
must be indifferent between doing so and not doing so (the first becomes an equality). The
following result is a slightly generalized version of results in Newbery (1984).
Proposition 1. Let
= 1 + P(l-6)2 - {(l+P(l-6)2)2 - 4p(l-5)2pF
2p(l-6)2p
zt = J, + ht V5r,
I = (l-p(l-6)pa)^[(l-pa-fi))^ + P(l-6)£ - aP(l-6)pfc+ + k/b\
= (l-(l-fi)o) H/r-a-fiJaz), and
Then if
(2-2) (l-^ttGWx z)
and o^z^ - z) < K, the function (p(I,h) = max[0, a(z-z)] is an equilibrium.
Proof: It is easy to verify that ot<l, so the difference equation implied by cp as the stocking
function in year of a normal harvest, namely :
Zt+] = It+1 + h+ = (l-5)a(Zt - z) + h+, is stable with steady state zmax. If the system starts with Zj
< zmax, then, z ^ will indeed be the supremum for z. (So It e D implies It+1 G D, as required.)
Thus the highest possible value of z during a drought is (l-5)a(zmax - z) + h", so that (2.2) implies
that regardless of z, during a drought there will be no carryout. Further, h+ > z implies that even
with no carryin, there will always be carryout if there is a normal harvest. Thus E^[f(z,h)] =
poc(z-z) regardless of z. Plugging this into the definition of equilibrium gives, in cases when h
= h+ and thus 1^0,
a(z~z ) =
(bz - (1-P(l-S))q P(l-G)b\h-pa(h++(l-6)az(l+(l-&)a)z )] - k
This is a straight line in z on both sides of the equation. The intercepts can easily be checked
to be equal by setting z =0, and matching the slope coefficients gives:
b
(2.3)
or p ( l - 6 ) 2 p « 2 ~ ( l + P ( l - 6 ) 2 ) a + 1 = 0 .
a as defined is clearly a solution to this equation. (Note that the other root could not do the
same job because, as is easily checked, it is greater than one and would cause explosive
behaviour.) The other properties are straightforward. Q.E.D.
Note that there is no guarantee that the equilibrium will have this form if the system is
started far above z ^ (i.e., if z^ £ D). The secret of the simplicity of the stocking function is
in the fact that in the indicated range it is an exogenous variable, the harvest, that determines
whether the system will stock out or not. Speculators accumulate stocks in good years and
dump them all during droughts.
A final note on the competitive equilibrium: it is unique. This is established in
Scheinkman and Schechtman (1983) and Deaton and Laroque (1991) for a much broader class
of demand functions than we consider here.
3. The Speculation Game.
Now we fix the number of speculators at n, and divide up the industry storage capacity
K among them. We presume that they are aware of each other's holdings so that the
inventory vector It = [ij, l\, ..., I"]' is always common knowledge. Equilibrium is now
defined as follows:
9DEFINITION. A vector of value functions VJ: Dx{h\h+}-»M, j=l,..,n, D cz {I: IJe[0,KJ] Vj},
will be called an equilibrium iff for any IeD and for either h there exist sales decisions s1,..^"
(with s = [s\..sn]') such that :
IJ Vj;
(3.1)(c) sJ>IJ-KJ Vj;
(3.1)(d) For each J, sJ(a-b[ZJ=iSi+h]) -k(IJ -sJ) + (3Es[VJ((l-5)(I-s),h)] >
s (a -b[Z^ + s + h]) - k(IJ - s ) + |3Es[VJ((l-5)(I1-s1),..,(l-5)(IJ-^),..(l-
for any s e [-(SJ^Js)+h),IJ]n[IJ-KJ,IJ].
(3.1)(e) For each j , VJ(I,h) = s)(a-b[S^=1sJ+h]) -k(V-s?) + pEfi[VJ((l-5)(I-s),h].
(3.1)(f) I G D implies (l-5)(I-s) G D.
Evidently the problem is a bit more complicated than the perfectly competitive one, but
these six conditions are all commonsensical. (3.1)(a) states that a speculator may not sell more
than she has on hand (or, put differently, may not choose to hold negative inventories). (3.1)(b)
says that speculators can not buy anything more than the whole crop. (3.1)(c) bounds purchases
with the capacity constraint. (3.1 )(d) is the first significant economic condition: it says that the
expected present value of profits of each speculator must be maximized given the understood
behaviour of the others; that at each moment speculation takes the form of a Nash equilibrium
in sales. Note the anatomy of this condition: sJ(a-b[][!"=]s^h]) is current revenue from sales
(possibly negative); k(IJ-sT) is the cost of holding the new level of stocks over to the next period;
and PE^[VT((l-5)(I-s),h)] is the discounted expected present value of the operation next period,
taking into account the revised level of stocks. The constraint on s in (3.1 )(d) is just the
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implication of (3.1)(a-c). Finally, (3.1)(e) guarantees that these value functions really do give the
expected present value of the income stream from speculation. It is the key recursive condition
that makes solution of this game possible. (Condition (3.1)(f) simply ensures that the value
functions are defined on any part of the state space that the equilibrium leads to.)
Thus, one can think of equilibrium in either of two ways: as the simultaneous solution of
n Bellman equations, each taking the solution of the other n-1 as given; or as a Nash equilibrium
of a two-period model, which thus maps the initial vector of value functions into a new one, with
the final equilibrium being a fixed point of this mapping. Importantly, the fact that this definition
insists on a Nash equilibrium at each value of IeD and both values of h means that the
equilibrium is not merely Nash, but subgame perfect.
Now note that the process by which It is transformed into It+1 is linear and the return to each
speculator (see (3.1)(d)) is quadratic in It. This suggests that we might be able to use the
well-known apparatus of linear-quadratic games2 in order to derive a solution elegantly, with
linear functions governing equilibrium motion of sales and stocks. The problem with this is the
non-negativity constraint on stocks. This means that when inventories are near zero, a bad
harvest will be likely to drive them right down to zero; thus in that region equilibrium carryout
will be independent of carryin, while elsewhere they will be a non-trivial linear function of the
carryin. Thus, the equilibrium behaviour can be at best piecewise linear, and the hope of
recovering anything simple in recursions as in (3.1)(e) is dim. It is because of the violence
non-negativity does to tractable linear-quadratic games that Judd (1990) decided not to rule out
2For a good discussion of general linear-quadratic dynamic programs, see Sargent (1987,
ch. 1). They are easily adapted to games; a general treatment is Kydland (1975). See Judd
(1990) for an application.
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negative inventories in his dynamic oligopoly model, preferring to find equilibria in which there
would be no stockouts, but that is not an option here, because in the study of commodity prices
the occurrence of stockouts is a large part of the interest. Further, it is widely known in game
theory that what could happen but does not — events off of the equilibrium path ~ could affect
what happens on the equilibrium path.
The solution we will explore here is inspired by the Newbery equilibrium discussed above:
we will hope to find a region of Rn, into which the vector of inventories will permanently settle,
in which the system will move between the two regimes — stockout and carryout ~ on the force
of the weather alone. That way we might pray that the value function will be "almost quadratic",
as:
\x'FJx ifh = h
where x = [1,I\ I2, ..., In]' and EJ and FJ are (n+l)-square matrices. (Note the constant in the
state vector.) It turns out that indeed in a wide variety of cases such equilibria exist. The
following proposition establishes a (cumbersome) sufficient condition which will be used later.
Proposition 2. Let e2 be negative and satisfy:
P2(l-5)4e^ - [2bP(l-5)2 - bp2(l-5)4]e2 + [b2 - pp(l-8)2b2
- 2(l-p)b2P(l-6)2]e2 + (l-p)b3 = 0.
Also let e2, e~2, g, e^ e{, ej, f, f", e0, e+0, and e0 be as given in Table I. Then if:
12
(3.2)(h)





e0 + e[lJ + 9^
ifh=h
ifh = h
constitute an equilibrium, with s = 2f/(n+l)t - 2gl if h = h+ and s = I if h = h", where i is a
vector of ones.
Note: It is easy to see that e{ = pe{ + (l-p)e; for i = 0,1,2. Thus, Eh[VT(I,h)] = e0 + e,IJ +
e2IJZ"=,IJ. Also note that VJ(I,h") = IJ(a-b[Z"=1IJ+h"]) + pe0, which is the revenue to J given a
general stockout plus discounted expected future earnings. Note also that we will assume
throughout that there are at least two speculators; similar reasoning works for a monopolist but
that case will be deferred.
Proof: See Appendix.
What this propostion says is that under certain conditions a quite simple system of
behavioural rules will constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. In a good year,
each speculator sells an amount given by a straight-line function of her own stocks and nothing
else, and in a drought all speculators sell everything. The intercept of the sales function is
negative, so that when stocks are low and the harvest is normal, speculators buy; and its slope
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is between zero and one, so that after a large number of consecutive good harvests stocks
converge to a maximum. Thus, the equilibrium looks much like the competitive one.
At this stage, it is not clear that any useful information is contained in Proposition 2. Most
of the conditions it assumes are unintuitive and, especially the cubic equation on which they all
hinge, intractable. How are we to know if there are any roots that, filtered through the complex
of definitions in Table I, will satisfy the key inequalities? Is there an easy way of finding these
roots? And what will be the relationship of this equilibrium to the competitive one? The
answers are found in the following three propositions, which show how simple the problem really
is.
Proposition 3. Let the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 hold. Let a be as given in
Proposition 1 and g be as in Proposition 2. Then a = l+2g.
Proof. Rearranging (3.2)(b) gives:
b 2g _ _ b
e2 = P(l-6)
where d = l+2g.
Combining (A.I) from the proof of Proposition 2 with (3.2)(a) gives:
e2 = ppe2(l-6)2(l+2g)2 -4pg2b - (l-p)b, so
14
((d-l)2p + l-p)b
(1 - pP(l -S)2d2)
Putting these two together yields:
(id)
6)V (1 - Pp(l-6)2<*2)
Thus,
(l-d)(l-pp(l-5)2d2) = p(l-6)2d(d-l)2p + (l-p)(3(l-5)2d, so
1 - pp(l-5)2d2-d + pp(l-6)2d3
= P(l-5)2pd3 - 2P(l-5)2pd2 + P(l-5)2pd + (l-p)(3(l-5)2d.
The cubic terms cancel. The equation then becomes:
|3p(l-6)2d2 - (l+p(l-5)2)d + 1 = 0 .
But this is exactly equation (2.3), which determined a. Since we know (by (3.2)(b) and the
negativity of e2) that d = l+2g is less than one, l+2g is equal to the smaller root of this equation.
But that is a. Q.E.D.
What this proposition tells us is that it is simple to calculate g, and from that, e2 (by
(3.2)(b)), and from that, everything else. More importantly for the economics of the matter, we
have, quite strikingly, the same marginal propensity to sell out of stocks for perfectly competitive
speculation as for the speculation oligopoly, and that regardless of the number of speculators,
as long as there are at least two. Similarly, since (l-5)(l+2g) = (l-5)ot is the autoregression
parameter for stocks in periods of normal harvest, these stocks will have exactly the same
persistence properties whether there are two speculators or a hundred thousand. The same is true,
15
clearly, for e2 and (by (3.2)(c)) for e^
Now, note that in both equilibria discussed so far aggregate sales by speculators in a normal
year take the form of a constant straight-line function of stocks carried in. The intercept is of
course negative in both cases. This proposition relates the two.
Proposition 4. The intercept of the normal-year aggregate sales function for an equilibrium
of the type described in Proposition 2 is always equal to n/(n+l) of the competitive intercept.
Proof: In the competitive case, carryout at the end of a normal year when there was zero
carryin is ot(h+ - z). Therefore, the competitive sales intercept is
(1 - Ppa(l-5))| b b
To find the intercept for the case of oligopoly, recall that each speculator's sales function
in Proposition 2 had an intercept of 2f/(n+l), so the aggregate intercept is 2nf/(n+l). Recalling
the definition of f, this equals:
n (a -bh+ +k -
(b -
n (a-bh+
\b _ p ( )
I P(l-fi)2a
16
(by (3.2)(b) and Proposition 3)
an
- - h+ + -
b b
* + — - h - apl— -h +— by (3.2)(c)
a i f
(» + l ) ( l -Ppa( l -6)) [ v
= n/(n+l) times the competitive intercept. Q.E.D.
Thus the intercept is farther from zero (smaller) the more speculators there are, with the
limit as n—>oo being the competitive case. Thus the competitive speculators will always buy more,
or sell less, than the imperfectly competitive, given the same level of inherited stocks. In
addition, for any set number of consecutive good harvests the competitive speculators will have
(n+l)/n times the stocks that the oligopolists would.
Proposition 5. The expected discounted profits of each oligopolistic speculator in the
period after a drought are strictly positive. They are strictly decreasing in the number of
speculators, and take a limit of zero as n—»oo. Furthermore, the aggregate speculative profits also
decline to zero as the market becomes crowded. Precisely,
17
2pa(a -bh + - P^





Ja - WT + * - P^a-6) - (b - |
i • x '
p 2 (^ ~ ^ + ^ ~~ P^i(l ~^
-P) (»+l)2 (b - pe2(l-5)2)
(again from (3.2)(e))
(a - bh* + k - fie
Q.E.D.
Finally, we complete the spectrum of market concentration:
Proposition 6. All of the results on oligopoly hold true for a monopoly if we plug n=l into
the above formulae.
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Proof: Consider the value function:
en + etl + e^I1 if h = h +
V(I9h) =< T ° * \IJ(a-b[I
 + h ]) + P P ^ 0 7 ( 1 ( 1 - P ) P ) if h = h ,
where I is now a scalar, the monopolist's holdings. Solving the first-order conditions for
Bellman's equation leads straightforwardly to s = f - 2gl, with f and g defined as above. This
is the non-cooperative sales function derived above, with n=l plugged in. Putting this into
Bellman's equation then gives us a quadratic function whose coefficients can be matched with
those of the value function, just as in the proof of Proposition 2. We recover the matching
equations from that proof, (A.I), (A.2) and a version of (A.3), with n=l immediately. Finally,
plugging n=l into (3.2)(h) turns it into:
a - bh + k
2b (1 - a(l-5))
Since the expression on the right hand side is the maximum stock of inventories the
monopolist would ever accumulate, the monopolist satisfying (3.2)(h) would never violate its
capacity constraint. Further, in a drought the monopolist's first order condition is satisfied by s
= f" - 2gl, which implies a stockout iff s > I, i.e., iff I < f 7(1+2g), which is the expression on
the left hand side. Thus, the inequality ensures that the monopolist will indeed stock out if and
only if there is a bad harvest, confirming that the proposed value function is the right one. Q.E.D.
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To sum up, despite the potential complexity in looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium
with an infinite horizon, in which every possible contingency of every possible future must be
embodied in each move, and despite the real complexity of some technical preliminaries in
Proposition 2, the equilibrium finally takes a form of terrible simplicity. The speculators sell all
in a drought and accumulate in good years, following a simple linear rule that leads them to buy
less each succeeding good year until they converge to a maximum. The slope of this linear rule
is the same regardless of the number of speculators, even for a monopoly, and it, as well as all
other coefficients of equilibrium, has a quite simple closed form expression.
4. The "Independence" Property and other features.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the equilibrium developed above is that in it each
speculator persistently ignores the others. The sales function for a good year is, we recall, s =
2f/(n+l)i + (l-a)I. There is no interaction between neighbor's stocks and own purchases; only
own stocks have any effect. This is the reverse of what one might expect, on the intuition that
a neighbor weighed down with stocks would be keen to dump some of them now, thus making
now a poor time to earn revenue from one's own stocks, and thus depressing own current sales.
Why is this not true?
Recalling from the proof of Proposition 2 the solution to l's first order condition, namely
s1 = f -
 g(r + z^r) - (1/2)1:^,
we can see that the reasoning is half right. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the (expected) sales
of others will lead 1 to reduce her own sales that period, by half of the increase. But holding
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sales constant, the stocks of others have their own positive effect on sales (recall g<0). Noting
that e2 is the expected derivative of the marginal value of own stocks with respect to other stocks,
and reviewing the definition of g ((3.2)(b)), we can see that -g is a measure of the weakening of
l's incentive to carry stocks into the next period due to an increase in the expected carryout of
others. This future effect comes from exactly the same source as the current sales effect; in fact,
it is the same effect, telescoped into the future along with the repercussions of the increased
inventories extending possibly infinitely far into the future. Thus, we have from the increase in
EJ^JF two conflicting forces, one arguing for clinging to stocks and the other for dumping them
now. These annihilate each other. 1 is worse off but has nothing to do about it.
A second feature of the equilibrium that bears special mention is its very marked tendency
toward equality. When the weather is good all speculators accumulate and in time approach their
respective limits ~ but since they all have the same limit, their differences wither away. One
might think that if one speculator had begun for whatever reason with eighty percent of total
stocks then he would continue to dominate the market, but in this equilibrium with good weather
that dominance would slowly be eroded, and with one bad year it would disappear overnight.
This is illustrated for a speculative duopoly by figure 1. Figure l(a) shows stock dynamics
during normal years and l(b) during droughts. In either case the arrows are always moving
toward the 45° line. (Note that Figure 1 also illustrates (3.2)(h). The region under the heavy line
is where
Z"=]IJ + IJ < 2f 7(l+2g) = K, J = 1,2, which we may recall from the proof of Proposition 2 is the
region in which stockouts are an equilibrium during droughts.)
This inexorable march toward equality provides a strong contrast with the competitive
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model, which, of course, makes no prediction at all about the distribution of stocks. It is also
one feature of the present model that does not seem to resemble the real world very much.
No attempt is made here to try to relate either of these properties to a lack of convexity in
demand. It is an obvious place to look for robustness. For example, there appear to be large
differences between the slope of the competitive cp function and that of the carryout function for
a monopolist in the case of isoelastic demand (see Williams and Wright, 1991, ch. 11), in
contrast to our finding of identical slopes.
5. The Case without Capacity Constraints.
The reader may well wonder why we bothered mentioning capacity constraints, since they
do not seem to affect anything. For example, in Figure 1, the capacity constraint vector can be
anywhere in the broken-line box between Imax and K/3 without changing anything about the
equilibrium at all. The answer has to do with the requirements of subgame perfection, and of
economic rationality.
If there were no capacity constraints, then generally (as we will see in numerical examples)
it will be possible for one speculator to buy enough stocks to so that next period carryin will lie
outside of the heavy line in Figure 1, in other words, in a region in which Z"=]IJ + IJ exceeds K.
The question is, if it is possible, but if everyone else plans to stay inside the region of interest,
is it desirable? If the answer is "No", then our whole argument and set of propositions are intact.
It seems implausible that the answer could be otherwise, since even within the region under the
heavy line, stocks above Imax drift back toward Imax; there is no tendency of this system to reach
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upward and bang against the capacity constraint. Would removing the constraint, then, change
that?
The answer is uncertain. The problem is that when one allows a speculator to leave that
region, one must ask what would happen if she actually did, in order to ask whether or not it
would be optimal to do so. Thus one needs to extend the value function to all points that are
accessible to speculators from under the heavy line. It appears to be a difficult thing to do.
Call the region under the heavy line R(l). Then one approach is to assume that one knows
that there is a region beyond the heavy line, say R(2), such that if I G R( 2 ) then in a drought I will
move into R(l) and in a normal year I will stay in R(2). Notice that the guess is that there is
no stock-out in a drought year, since the original value function was defined by the assumption
of stockouts in bad years, and R(l) encloses all of those points for which stockouts are an
equilibrium in bad years. By this method, one can calculate a value function for R(2) and try
to figure out whether or not it will be optimal for any speculator to move there given that no one
else is doing so.
But then one must verify that, once in R(2), it really will be optimal to descend to R(l) if
everyone else is instead of heading up to a higher level still. This verification means extending
the value function to some R(3), etc.
Thus, one would wind up with an infinite number of subdivisions of R2 (or Rn), each
subdivision R(i) defined by which subdivision the system would wind up in under which harvest
if it began in R(i). Each subdivision would have its own coefficients for the value function
because although each would have its coefficient matching equations analogous to (A.I), (A.2)
and (A.3), they would all be different from those equations because they would not have the
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unique feature of a universal stockout in bad weather. (Tinkering with these equations suggests
that the coefficients converge far from the origin.) Thus we would wind up with a very
complicated piecewise quadratic function, over which it would be very hard to optimize3.
Thus, proving that the equilibrium of Propositions 2-5 would survive the removal of capacity
constraints is an unsolved problem. It is curious: adding the non-negativity constraint robs us
of tractability; adding a capacity constraint then gives it back.
6. Some Notes on the Behaviour of Prices, and Numerical Examples.
Perhaps the main reason to study this sort of model is to see what implications it might have
for the behaviour of primary commodity prices, an area of huge policy interest. As a quick
exercise in that line, we here derive price autoregression functions under the different market
structures. Deaton and Laroque (1991) studied these functions under perfect competition for a
very broad class of demand functions and found that they all were piecewise linear (for i.i.d.
harvests), rising at the reciprocal of P(l-5) up to a threshold price, then becoming flat beyond
that price. The former portion corresponded to normal harvests and the latter to drought years.
Here we will offer minor revisions.
We will suppress superscripts in what follows; Es will mean the sum of all speculators'
sales, and so on. Suppose one has an equilibrium in which Zs = y + (l-a)ZI if h = h+ and Ss
= B if h = h\ Then if SI = I and h = h+, p = a - b[y +(l-ot)T + h+]
= a - b[y + h+] - b(l-a)I. Thus, in a normal year the maximum possible price is
3
 A special case of this extended model, with h = 0 and p = 0, would yield a resource
extraction game closely akin to that of Loury (1990), but without any indivisibility.
24
= a - b[y + h+]. In a drought year, the price is always at least pmin = a - b[Zlmax+ h]
ab I (l-o(l-8)) J
Thus, drought prices are always higher than normal year prices if pmin > p,j,ax, which is true if
(h+ - h + y) > Elmax, which we will assume to be true. In that case, we can divide the
autoregression function into two portions, the part above pmm corresponding to droughts and the
rest to normal years.
Pick some price p between p*^ and pmm. Then given a price p < p we can deduce that Si
= (l/b(l-a))(a - b[y+h+] - p). Then since Zlt+1 = (l-5)(aZlt-y), the expectation of next year's
price is given by:
+ (i-i
(where tildes refer to next period random variables)
Thus the function is linear for p<p. For the competitive equilibrium, this reduces to
Efi[p] = k/p(l-6) + p/(3(l-5), as it should. Note as well that y does not enter into the slope; only
a does. Therefore, the slope of the autoregression function is independent of the number of
speculators in the market and so always equals 1/(1-5)J3. The intercept, however, does depend
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on y. The competitive intercept is a lower bound, since Ej;[p] below the competitive
autoregression function would mean expected losses on every unit held. Thus, this may be a way
of identifying empirically markets whose speculators are protected from entry: if we know
somehow that marginal holding costs are small (k « 0), then we could look for a positive
intercept for the price autoregression function.
For p > p, we know that next year's stocks will be zero, so
=a - b[ h + py ].
This is decreasing in y; the more competitive speculation is, the more that will be purchased by
speculators in the aftermath of a drought (the more negative y will be), and so the higher prices
will be after the drought. Thus, more competition means higher price expectations during a
drought.
Further, it will mean a less disperse asymptotic price distribution. In every state of nature,
high prices (that is, prices above p) will be lower and low prices higher when there is more
competition. To see this, note that with the above notation, if at time t there have been T normal
harvests since the last drought, inventories will be given by:
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This is clearly decreasing in y, so an increase in the number of speculators, by lowering y, will
increase the quantity of stocks held after any harvest sequence and thus increase the amount that
will be dumped on the market in drought. Thus, any price above p will be lowered. Further,
sales in year t if it is a year with a normal harvest are:
[
^ 1 - (l-6)a ) '
With more speculators, less will be sold for any given level of stocks carried in, but there will
also be more stocks carried in for given harvest sequence. The former effect dominates, as the
above expression shows, and a fall in y reduces sales in any year with a normal harvest, thus
raising any price below p. Thus, with more speculators, the price distribution is drawn in toward
this intermediate level of p, and prices are made less volatile.
To give some idea of magnitudes, let us call the "base case" a model with p = 3/4, h+=60,
h~=20, a = 100, b = 1, P = 0.97, n = 2, 8 = 0.1, k=l. In that case, a = 0.7414, and the intercept
of aggregate sales is -3.8181 in the case of perfect competition and -2.5454 for the duopoly.
Thus, there is not much storage; maximum aggregate stocks are 10.3269 and 6.8846 respectively,
in a market in which every four years on average production drops by 40 units. The intercepts
for the price autoregression function are 1.1455 (=k/p(l-5)) and 2.1573, so the increase in the
intercept due to market power can be quite significant. With everything else unchanged but k=0,
the autoregression intercept is still 1.3937. (Would that be far enough away from zero to
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distinguish them econometrically?)
To demonstrate how easy it is to satisfy (3.2)(h) in the base case, K here equals 34.8501.
We need the individual stock maximum to be less than K/(n+l), but here the individual maximum
equals 3.4423.
Behaviour and profits are fairly sensitive to cost parameters. If we bring holding costs down
from one per unit to zero, the maximum aggregate inventories go up by about half, to 14.2239
and 9.4826, and individual profits just coming out of a drought double: e0 goes from 109.2371
to 207.2355. However, it is surprisingly easy to erase those gains by letting a few more
speculators into the market. With k=0 and n=20, e0 drops to 4.2293! Whatever available
weapons for entry deterrence would surely be used. Importantly, we see that a fairly small fixed
cost will be enough to keep entry down to a small number of players. This is apparent from
Proposition 5, which shows that profits fall with entry roughly at the rate n2.
An interesting experiment is to vary the popularity of the good alone, that is, the parameter
a. Paradoxically, when the good becomes too popular the speculators can practically be put out
of business. Returning to the base case and setting a=120, we find that maximum aggregate
stocks fall to 0.4287 for competition and 0.2858 for the duopoly. e0 takes a value of 0.1882.
Why this malaise among traders of what is clearly a hot product? The parallel shift of the
demand schedule up 20 dollars increases the buying price by 20 dollars ceteris paribus, but the
discounted selling price by only (3(1-8)20 « 17 for a unit to be sold next year and less for units
sold later. Thus, in present value, the speculator is out at least 3 dollars per unit per period. By
the same token, consumer weariness of the good which sends the parameter a down to 80 is a
gift to the speculators. Maximum aggregate stocks increase to 20.2252 and 13.4384 respectively,
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and e0 shoots up to 418.9990.
Another way of viewing this is as the effect of a subsidy to consumers of the good. Such
a subsidy reduces storage and makes the price more volatile, clearly exacerbating the welfare
losses resulting from oligopoly. Perhaps this can help explain the almost ubiquitous tendency
toward public sector storage accompanying grain subsidies in the post-war era. A last
interpretation, if the producers and consumers lie on opposite sides of a border, is as the effect
of a tariff. A reduction in a could be brought about by a rise in the consumer country's (specific)
tariff; paradoxically, the traders would favor the tariff against their produce (perhaps unless it was
raised at a moment when they already held large stocks). On the other hand, a rise in b would
represent an increase in a variable import levy, a tariff linearly falling in pt. This would hurt the
traders if b was initially low and help them if it was large (for example, when b=0.5, e0
=949.6697; when b=l, e0=109.2371; and when b=l.l, eo=259.6495. e0 follows a parabolic-type
path in b with minimum around b=0.8).
The strident opposition of the international grain oligopoly to the Common Agricultural
Policy is well documented (Morgan, 1979, pp. 130-4). Perhaps if the EEC had imposed a
specific tariff rather than a variable levy it would have found a different response?
(3.2)(h) is easily satisfied in all of these examples. Thus, the model does work over a wide
range of parameter values and offers a rich variety of comparative dynamics.
7. Conclusion.
We have presented a model of commodity trading and speculation in the presence of
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restricted entry into speculation. We have solved the model for an infinite horizon subgame
perfect equilibrium which turns out to be extremely tractable, and has three properties worth
pointing out: One, the independence property: in equilibrium, no speculator's behaviour affects
the others'. Two, a persistent movement toward equal levels of stocks regardless of their initial
distribution. Finally, profits fall at the rate n2 (Proposition 5) while the difference in aggregate
behaviour from perfect competition falls at the rate n (Propositon 4); therefore even a small fixed
cost of entry would keep the market concentrated and noticeably different from a competitive
one.
Changes in the number of firms result in parallel shifts of equilbrium behaviour functions.
These have an effect on price dispersion, which falls as the number of traders rises. A surprising
result is that the oligopolists would lobby in favor of a tariff against their produce, and that this
tariff would improve welfare by increasing storage.
The verisimilitude of the model is in doubt, especially regarding property two, but perhaps
it is a start and perhaps useful as a benchmark. A natural next step would be to search out other
equilibria and to find out which properties depend on straight-line demand functions and which
are robust.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof: Consider speculator 1. In a year with a normal harvest, she will maximize:
s](a - b E U s W ] ) - k(I] - s1) + (3Efi[VJ((l-6)(I-s),h)]
= s](a - M I ^ s W ] ) - k(I] - s1) + p[e0 + e^l-aKl'-s1) + e ^ l - S ^ s 1 ) ! 1 ^ - ^ ) ] .
(We have used the difference equation It+1 = (l-5)(It-st).) Taking the derivative with respect to
s1 and setting it equal to zero yields:
s1 = (2b-2(3(l-5)2e2)-1[a-bh++ k -(3(l-5)er2|3(l-5)2e2r -P(l-5)2e2Z^,IJ -
But since this is true for all speculators simultaneously,
s = ft - g(In + u')I - (l/2)(uf - In)s,
where i is a vector of ones and In is the identity matrix. This implies:
s = 2f/(n+l)i - 2gl,
using the fact that [In - (l/(n+l))n'][In + u'] = In. Now, noting from the definition of g that
it is negative (since e2 is assumed negative) and less than 1/2 in absolute value, it is clear that
the difference equation It+1 = (l-5)(It-st) = -2(l-5)f/(n+l)i + (l-5)(l+2g)It for normal years is
stable, and that the maximum level any speculator's inventories could reach after an infinite run
of good harvests is
, _ _ 2(1-5)/
Thus, by (3.2)(h), none of the speculators will ever exceed capacity, so condition (3.1)(c) is
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satisfied. (3.1)(b) is also trivially satisfied as long as S"=,KJ is less than h+. Further, since by
assumption f<0, inventories are never negative and (3.1)(a) is satisfied. (Note that the
equilibrium sales function has a negative intercept. This means that in the first good year after
a drought, speculators buy.)
Condition (3.1)(f) is satisfied by the stability of the difference equation if we define D as
{I : IJe[0,KJ] Vj}. Condition (3.1)(d) is satisfied for h = h+ by construction. (Note that e2<0
guarantees that the second order condition is satisfied.) For h = h", we must ask under what
conditions with the given next-period value function it would be a Nash equilibrium for all
parties to stock out. Returning to speculator l's problem discussed above, if there is now a
drought on and all others are selling their entire stocks, the level of sales which would satisfy her
first order condition is:
s1 = f - g(l' +Z;.,IJ) - ( 1 / 2 ) 1 ^ = f - 2gl' - ((l+2g)/2)SJ,,F
> I1 iff
pi (U2g)
Therefore, since by (3.2)(h) and our results on the stability of the system,
a - bh~ + k P ( ) ,
V <> — — — V j
b(n+l)
at all times, we have established that stockouts are indeed an equilibrium during a drought.
The last condition is the most tedious to check, but also the most informative since it gives
us a way of calculating the coefficients. This is (3.1)(e), the recursive condition. Consider the
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case of a normal harvest. We first plug the behavioural functions we have derived into (3.1)(e).
We find:
VUh+) = (2f/(n+l) -2gI1)(a-b[2nf/(n+l) - 2gZ--1F+h+])
- k(I] - 2f/(n+l) + 2gr> + Pe0 + Pe^l-SKI1 - 2f/(n+l) + 2gl!)
+ pe^l-S)2^ - 2f/(n+l) + 2gI1)(^1(l+2g)IJ - 2f/(n+l) ).
The right hand side expression can be gathered into four terms: a constant, a term in I1, a
term in I 'S^F , and a term in S"=1IJ. The latter has a coefficient equal to:
2f/(n+l)[2bg - |3e2 (l-8)2(l+2g)] = 0, (using (3.2)(b)) as required, since the proposed value
function has no term linear in Z"=iIJ- Matching up coefficients for I]Z!"=]IJ gives:
(A.I) e+ = Pe2(l-5)2(l+2g)2 -4g2b.
Using e2 = pe2 + (l-p)e2 and (3.2)(b) to eliminate the g's turns this into the cubic equation at the
beginning of the statement of this proposition, and since e2 was defined as a root of that equation,
(A.I) is satisfied. Matching coefficients of I1 yields:
(A.2) e| = -2g(a-b[2nf/(n+l) + h+]) - k(l+2g) + pe,(l-5)(l+2g)
- Pe2(l-5)2(l+2g)2nf/(n+l)
= -2g(a-bh+) - k(l+2g) + pei(l-5)(l+2g) (using (3.2)(b)).
Combining this with (3.2)(d) shows that it is identical to the first statement of (3.2)(c). Thus,
(A.2) holds. Finally, matching up constant terms gives us:
(A.3) ej = 2f/(n+l)(a - b[2nf/(n+l) + h]) + Pe0 - $e,(\-5)2V(n+l) + pe2(l-5)24f2n/(n+l)2
+ 2kf/(n+l).
Using (3.2)(g) to eliminate the ej and bringing the e0 to the left hand side shows that (A.3) is
equivalent to the definition of e0, which is the first statement of (3.2)(f). Thus (A.3) holds.
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It is trivial to check the coefficients for the drought case. This is, in fact, done in the note
in the statement of the proposition. We conclude that (3.1)(e) holds, as required. Q.E.D.
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TABLE I: Notation
= (e2 + (l-p)*)/p; e2 = -b;
(3.2)(b) g =
(3-2)(d)
 el = (Ci _ ( i
a - bh+ + k -
(3.2)(e) f =
similarly f" has h" instead of h+;
e0 =
l + ife - Pe^l-5) + p«,(l-6)2^3t_[; and
Figure 1.1 (a):
Normal Year
rFigure l.l(b):
Drought
